






This article argues that the following seven
thoughts are absent from most formal
reflections on teaching: 1.We do not teach in an
ideological vacuum; 2. We are not here to give
students what they want, but rather what we
know to be good for them; 3. Every model of
learning implies a model of humanity, and may
be judged by it; 4. Students do not know what
higher education is; 5. Higher education is
education in values; 6. Classes are the
common rite in the cathedral of reason; 7.The
lofty aims intrinsic to higher education are
necessary enabling conditions for the utilitarian,
economistic aims imposed on it from without. It
concludes that we have to pay attention to
some rather old-fashioned ideas about
pedagogy in order to get the full benefits from
the latest teaching technology.
Introduction
What follows here draws on no empirical
studies, but is rather an argument rooted in
reflection on the experience of teaching
students and of talking about teaching with
colleagues (together with some established
results in the philosophy of science). In other
words, it is phenomenological rather than
empirical. Phenomenology is subject to two
tests. First, is it analytically satisfactory? That is
to say, are the distinctions clear? Are the
inferences valid? Secondly, does it gather and
articulate some part of the reader’s
experience? The point of writing this article is
not to tell you, my academic colleague,
something that you do not know. On the
contrary, the aspiration is to articulate
something that you do know but may not have
got around to saying yet. That, however, covers
a lot. From the mass of truths that go unsaid, I
have picked seven because, I think, they offend
in some way against the prevailing political and
educational temper of our times. The question
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is not simply ‘are these seven thoughts true?’
but rather ‘how can they be made effective?’
Please let me know if I’ve hit the mark, or if I’ve
missed, by how much and in what direction.
I do not intend to criticise anyone’s
teaching practice. Since I rarely see the inside
of other lecturers’ classrooms, I am in no
position to pass judgment on what colleagues
do there, even if I wished to. Rather, the
principal object of my criticism is the way we
talk about teaching. In particular, I have in mind
two relatively formal discourses about
teaching: pedagogical research and the
academic quality apparatus. My basic premise
is that the seven thoughts I explore below are
largely absent from these two discourses. We
lecturers do not get around to articulating these
thoughts because the formal apparatus for
reflecting on teaching does not make room for
them. This matters, because ultimately theory
does affect practice.
This is not a view from the mountain-top:
as a participant in pedagogical seminars and
as an author of subject monitoring and
evaluation reports and documents for
validations and reviews, I am as firmly
implicated in these discourses as anyone.
1) We do not teach in an ideological vacuum
No-one wants schoolchildren to eat junk.
Everyone agrees that it would be better if
children ate food, but in spite of this
consensus, they eat junk. To change that,
Jamie Oliver is going to have to pay attention to
the large social, political and economic
structures and imperatives that conspire to
thwart the virtuous consensus. So too for us. If
we are determined not to serve intellectual
turkey twizzlers, we must pay attention to the
bigger picture. In particular, we have to
examine the murky background of that big
picture; the unspoken ideology, the economic
imperatives and the habits of mind that
conspire to carve a path of least resistance
away from genuine higher education and
towards the dumbed-down degree factory.
Above all, we must examine students’ beliefs
about and expectations of higher education
(just as Jamie Oliver spent a lot of his time
working on children’s tastes in food). No-one
wants degree factories, but then no-one wants
children to eat junk.
The easiest place to start is with our own
habits of mind. We must pay attention to the
metaphors we use to talk about pedagogy. We
should stop talking about the ‘delivery’ of
‘provision’. When a new fridge is delivered to a
house, the householder stands by while the
deliveryman does all the work, heaving it out of
the van, up the steps and through to the
kitchen. In other words, the ‘delivery’ metaphor
encodes and approves of student passivity.
Gardening metaphors (such as ‘cultivating the
intellect’) are more accurate, because the
gardener looks after the soil, the light and the
temperature, but the plant has to do the
growing. Our job is to maintain an environment
conducive to intellectual growth, but it is up to
the students to grow. We cannot do it for them,
and we should take care to employ metaphors
that express that truth. This is not a covert
argument for reducing lecturers’ work.
Gardening can be every bit as exhausting as
fridge-delivery. So why would anyone prefer the
delivery metaphor to gardening metaphors?
One reason arises from the management of
academic quality. The growth of a plant is a
subtle and complex process, and if the plant
fails to bloom, it may be hard to say who or
what is to blame. On the other hand, if a fridge
is not delivered as ordered, blame can be
apportioned accurately, by examining the
paperwork. For good, obvious and respectable
reasons, managers like to see ‘clear lines of
responsibility’. The delivery metaphor helps to
sustain the fiction that learning and teaching
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are the sort of activities in which blame can be
allocated precisely.
We live in a technocratic culture that
pretends to regard language as an
ideologically neutral means of storing and
transferring information. Language is more than
this; it shapes our imagination and makes
some thoughts easier to think than others.
Awareness of this requires ceaseless mental
fight. We cannot take charge of our own
thoughts, let alone speak the truth to power, if
we do not examine the metaphors that pass
between us.
2) We are not here to give students what
they want, but rather what we know to be
good for them
Students often do not know what is good for
them. Like the children in Jamie’s School
Dinners, many students will choose intellectual
turkey twizzlers if we let them. An essential part
of Jamie Oliver’s campaign was forcibly to
remove children’s junk in order to make them
eat food — and with what shocking
indifference to the ideology of consumer
choice! Then he showed the older children
what goes into a chicken nugget. Thus
educated, these children were left to choose,
and they almost invariably chose wisely. Note
the order of events: education before free
choice. Indeed, we may wonder whether a
choice made in ignorance can be free (rather
than arbitrary or whimsical). 
Obviously, our relationship with students is
not that of retailer to customer. But competition
between universities, faculties, departments
and subject groups presses us all to behave
more commercially. In some ways, this is a
good thing. It is no longer possible for
universities to treat their students (or students’
parents) as a necessary nuisance. Ultimately,
consumerism is a damaging picture of our
relationship with our students, and we must
take care that it does not shape our thoughts
surreptitiously.
Consumerism will shape our thoughts if we
do not take care because it is part of the
unspoken common mind of our age. To use the
computer imagery that is also a powerful and
often pernicious part of that common mind,
consumerism is the ‘default option’.
Hence, ‘student-centred’ cannot mean
‘customer-focused’, and we will not fulfil our
laudable aim to practise student-centred
teaching merely by increasing the choices
available to students, or by doing whatever it
takes to improve student feedback
questionnaire scores. Rather, we have to ensure
that we understand our students well enough to
know that we really are giving them what is
good for them. This is more difficult than
knowing what they want, and much more
difficult than knowing what they say they want. It
gets harder as our students become more
diverse and less like we were at their age. What
is more, we should think of our students not just
as customers or future employees but rather as
people whose most profound needs cannot be
met with anything that can be bought. Those
needs include companionship, recognition of
one’s moral worth and public confirmation of
the ethos by which one is trying to live.
Sometimes, the diligent student who does the
reading before the class can feel as lonely and
ridiculous as Don Quixote, doggedly living by
standards that others find quaint and silly.
Notice that these are all social needs. The
last one is the particular responsibility of the
institution charged with sustaining a given
ethos (in our case, an academic ethos). What
tone is set, what message about priorities is
sent, for example, by cancelling classes
throughout a university to make way for non-
academic activities? How would a university
regard a lecturer who refused to teach students
who persistently failed to prepare for class?
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Why do so many university websites embody
the assumption that prospective
undergraduates have no interest in our
research? Of course, few students want to read
our research. But descriptions of research
remind the students, their parents and
everyone else that a university is a living
embodiment of the academic ethos, rather
than merely a repository of curricular content.
3) Every model of learning implies a model
of humanity, and may be judged by it
We cannot say what it is for a human to learn
without saying something about what humans
are like. Therefore, we may test a model of
learning by comparing its implied model of
humanity with what we already know about
people. Humans think feelingly and
imaginatively. We humans (including students)
live first in a world of meanings, connotations
and associations, which are only later resolved
into thoughts, facts, hypotheses and suchlike.
What is more, our world of images, feelings and
meanings comes painted in ethical colours.
Words and deeds, people and things strike us
as admirable, mean, unfair, compassionate,
and so on. Also, our experience tends to be
densely connected: a smell can summon a
whole world of memory; a book can re-draw
one’s map of the future. Consequently, any
model of learning that finds no place for
feelings and the imagination is too
impoverished to be of any use. Any model that
forgets that students are ethical agents who
make judgments of value as well as of utility will
struggle to understand student motivations. Any
model that conceives of learning as the transfer
of isolated packets of information is false to the
connectedness of human experience. Human
learners do not access information, they seize
ideas and make them their own.
If we want students to embrace their
studies, we have to stop talking about them in
a way that could equally well apply to
laboratory rats or Turing machines. Laboratory
rats do not pursue ends simply because they
perceive them to be intrinsically worthwhile,
and Turing machines do not synthesise their
packets of data into coherent experiential
wholes, or seek recognition and approval from
other Turing machines. Of course, no lecturer
thinks of any individual student as a rat or a
computer; still less do we treat our students
that way. However, when we lecturers gather to
discuss learning and teaching, we tend to
focus on the mechanical aspects because
these are the easiest to talk about. As a
profession, we seem to lack a language to talk
about the lived experience of learning and
teaching. Fearful of sounding like mystery-
mongers, we discuss configurations of
classroom furniture, the use of technological
teaching aids or some such, even though
these are in fact marginal to our teaching
practice. That is how we come to talk about
students as if they were laboratory rats or
computers. That is what we do whenever we
discuss the mechanical aspect of teaching
without connecting it to the inner lives of 
our students.
As I said at the outset, my principal targets
are the formal discourses of pedagogical
research and the academic quality apparatus,
rather than informal conversations among
teachers and lecturers. Take a pedagogical
model from the learning and teaching literature,
or an academic quality document such as a
programme specification. Does it reflect,
respect and minister to the fact that students
are feeling, imaginative ethical agents, each of
whose experience and activity forms a (mostly)
coherent whole?
Why do we struggle to articulate the higher
humanity of students, that is, the ways they
differ from Turing machines and laboratory
rats? Writers on pedagogy from earlier ages,
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and in particular churchy Victorians such as
Matthew Arnold or J.H. Newman, had more
success in this regard. A comprehensive
explanation for this would require a cultural and
intellectual history from their time to ours, but
the short answer is that theology is out and
cognitive science is in.1 In most respects, this
change is progress. Nevertheless, there are
things that theology finds easier to see and to
say than does cognitive science. Theologically-
informed discussions of pedagogy naturally
focus on the ethical and affective aspects of
learning that more instrumental and
technologically-minded approaches tend to
neglect. For such teachers, it was obvious that
the main task of education is to remedy defects
in the students themselves. The main questions
for these Victorian educators were ‘what sort of
character does this education produce?’ and
‘what sort of character ought we to try to
produce?’ These questions are difficult to ask
in earnest now, partly because ‘character’
sounds hopelessly unscientific and partly
because controlling others’ moral development
sounds unacceptably manipulative. The
commercial aspect of present-day education
also militates against this approach. It is a bold
salesperson who tells putative customers that
they are morally and intellectually defective.
Here, in passing, is a good reason to read old
books: to identify and illuminate the blind spots
and taboos of present-day ways of looking and
speaking. To paraphrase another
unfashionable figure,2 what does he know of
the present, who only the present knows?
4) Students do not know what higher
education is
Nor do we, in the sense that there is no agreed
set of necessary and sufficient conditions that
jointly define higher education. But we do know
something about what it is not (this is often the
case with philosophically interesting terms).3
Many students arrive at university with a bucket-
model of education.4 You pass a module by
mugging up some stuff and reproducing it in
coursework and exams. Then, you forget it.
Higher education must be more than this.
Often, students who subscribe to the
bucket view do not expect to enjoy their studies
— and why would they? Education as they
understand it is a suitable activity for a disk-
drive; it is purgatory for a human being. It is
hardly surprising that these students do not
embrace their studies. Consequently, every
programme of study should include some
discussion of the nature and purposes of
higher education. Students are hardly likely to
commit to learning if they do not know what it is
for or how it might be satisfying.
Naturally, we cannot simply tell them what
higher education is, since we are not altogether
sure ourselves. Rather, the aim (as always
when teaching essentially contested concepts)
is to equip students to participate in the
discussion and invite them to make up their
own minds.
Most students understand (some more
consciously than others) that higher education
changes a person. Sometimes, students resist
our efforts because no-one has bothered to
explain what we are trying to change them into.
This is entirely reasonable. Students who do
not have graduates among their relatives,
friends and neighbours often worry that higher
education will estrange them from their former
lives. This too is a reasonable fear. Education
can set a person apart. These anxieties require
a discussion about the nature and purpose of
higher education. Why would anyone in
education refuse that? There are plenty of
reasons. First, some potential students may not
wish to be changed, and hence decide that
higher education is not for them. Secondly, this
discussion would require us to confess that we
do not quite know what higher education is.
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Thirdly, an educationalist who talks about the
way education changes a person runs the risk
of sounding like Matthew Arnold. Nevertheless,
education does change people, and we should
talk to the students about that.
5) Higher education is education in values
Every institution, including ours, has a
characteristic ethos. We value rigorous, gleeful
curiosity and free discussion. Trying to instil
these values in students is part of our job, and
we should tell them that.
There is a streak of populist moral
relativism in the spirit of the present age that
intimidates some academics on this point. Is it
not authoritarian to impose our value
judgments on students? In fact, we do not
impose our values on students and we could
not if we wanted to. We have two options:
either we explain the ethos of academic life to
our students and thereby give them the
possibility of embracing it themselves, or we
keep quiet and leave them in the dark about
why we do what we do. The academic ethos
itself, and common honesty, require us to
choose the first. Of course, if we make our
values explicit, students will hold us to them.
In any case, there is no cause for
academics to be shy about their professional
values. We know that rigorous, gleeful curiosity
and free discussion are good, just as we know
that murder is bad. We know that some books
are better than others, just as we know that
some essays are better than others, and we
think it matters — not as much as the AIDS
crisis in Africa but rather more than the
outcome of Big Brother. Part of our job is to
help students to recognise truth, beauty and
goodness when they meet them. These are not
merely matters of opinion, although they are
essentially contested notions. There is a
debate to be had about exactly where and how
truth, beauty and goodness may be found; it is
part of our job to equip students to participate
in it. This applies across the university: in
engineering, for example, we can ask whether
the ingenious solution is the most elegant;
whether the most elegant is the most cost-
effective; and whether the most cost-effective
solution is socially responsible. (I do not doubt
that engineering lecturers do this. The point is
that in doing so, they are thinking about truth,
beauty and the good.)
Students implicitly accept the university
ethos when they enrol. We should tell them
what they are letting themselves in for, and
make the academic ethos a regular part of the
conversations we have with them. Indeed, it
should be the animating principle of those
conversations, or else we will have fallen 
into inauthenticity.
6) Classes are the common rite in the
cathedral of reason
Why give classes? Why not transmit information
to students in more effective and flexible ways?
We may as well ask: why do people go to
religious buildings to worship together? Why
don’t they just pray and sing at home? God,
being omnipresent, presumably would not
mind. Or, for a secular analogy: why do people
go to football matches? You get a much better
view of the action on television, and you get
replays in slow-motion from several angles. Or
again, why do people go to political rallies?
Surely, they could signal their support more
efficiently by sending a text-message or email.
The answer is something like this: you have to
be there to make a public affirmation of your
commitment to your faith, your team or your
cause, and to witness others doing the same.
Religious meetings, football matches and
political rallies are celebrations of common
purpose from which individuals may draw
comfort and encouragement when they are
later alone and wavering.
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If we want students to commit to their
studies, we should look at practices that
people engage in wholeheartedly (like religion,
football and politics). These have common rites
that speak to our need to know that we are not
quixotically alone in our values (laboratory rats
and Turing machines have no such need). We
should think of our classes in this way rather
than as information-exchanges, and alter our
practice accordingly. The student who skips the
class because the notes are available online is
like someone who thinks that reading the order
of service is equivalent to going to church, or
that reading the programme is equivalent to
going to the match, or that reading a pamphlet
is as good as going to the rally. Classes are our
main opportunity to address the social needs I
mentioned at the end of section two.
This may make teaching sound like
preaching, but with the ethical and social
dimensions of education in view, this is hardly
surprising. Of course, classes have other
functions too. They are an opportunity to be a
critical friend to students; to engage in
dialogue that would be clumsier and slower by
email or some other remote means; to foster
the social skills requisite for reasoned debate.
But the most neglected and easily overlooked
purpose of classes is this social, ethos-
confirming role. Lecturers do not merely
communicate to students; we commune with
them, and they with each other.
What does this mean in practical terms? It
may be as simple as ensuring that there is time
to enjoy the material. In a class stuffed with
content, there is no opportunity to revel in the
details. Cut back on the content and use the
time saved to talk about why this stuff is
interesting or important. Point out bits that you
find interesting even if they are not quite on the
main track. Take a moment to show the
students something from the recent research if
you think it might help them to see the
significance of the assessed material. Show
them that there are live questions as well as
fixed answers and established solutions. This is
particularly important in cumulative disciplines
where the point of this year’s stuff is to prepare
for next year’s stuff. Those students who just
want to get through their assessments as
efficiently as possible may express some
irritation at these apparently irrelevant and self-
indulgent asides. Turn their resistance into a
teachable moment. Explain that in wandering
off the lesson-plan, you are giving them a
tutorial in gleeful curiosity.
7) The lofty aims intrinsic to higher
education are necessary enabling
conditions for the utilitarian, economic aims
imposed on it from without
This may seem like a splendid sermon —
meaning, a speech one can enjoy on a Sunday
precisely because it has no connection with
anything that happens from Monday to Friday.
Our students have to get jobs in an
increasingly globalised market, and our first
responsibility is to ensure that they have the
necessary skills. Isn’t it?
This reaction is mistaken. Students will not
acquire their economically useful skills unless
they find their motivation in the activity of
learning itself. Extraneous goads and bribes
(such as the threat of failure and the promise of
higher earnings) rarely carry a student all the
way through a degree programme. In fact, a
wholly disengaged student cannot succeed in
higher education. To be successful, a student
must learn to make sound judgments, and all
judgment has an aesthetic aspect.5 A
mathematics student must be struck by the
elegance of a proof; a science student must
feel the weight of evidence (or the lack of it). In
the humanities, a lot of bad writing is the result
of students trying to articulate and defend
judgments that they have copied from
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secondary sources rather than felt in their
viscera. The same point applies to directly
vocational studies, especially those that require
quick decisions, such as nursing. This is not to
say that judgment is all inarticulate conviction
or unreasoned snap decisions. However, a
graduate should have developed the expert
intuitions that guide judgment in new situations
or cases that were not covered in the lecture-
notes. This education in feeling, this refinement
of specialist sensibility cannot happen if a
student simply has no feeling for the discipline
at all, or if the discipline evokes a single,
uniform reaction such as boredom or
resentment. A student who knows that the
argument on page 84 is a good one simply
because it satisfies the rules set out on pages
64–73, but who does not feel the force of its
logic, is unlikely to develop the critical-thinking
skills that are demanded by employers and
essential to anyone hoping for promotion into
senior management.
For this reason, joy in learning is not merely
desirable. It is essential. We (the university) have
to foster a culture in which students can
discover and express without embarrassment a
delight in learning and find it reflected in other
students and in staff. Joy does not usually figure
in the aims, objectives, learning outcomes,
programme specifications and benchmark
documents that jointly constitute our official
professional effort to say what we do and why.
Until it does, these documents will never be
more than pro forma6 exercises.
In short, we must consciously adopt a
pedagogical discourse that takes full account
of students’ humanity. Doing so may
sometimes cause us to sound a bit old-
fashioned, even a bit like churchy Victorians.
Ironically, this is what we have to do in order to
take full advantage of the unprecedented
technological teaching-aids available now and
in the future.
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Endnotes
1 In fairness, I should note that computational cognitive
science has moved some way beyond Turing machines.
2 Kipling.
3 Spinoza: ‘All determination is negation’.
4 W.B. Yeats: ‘Education is not filling a bucket, but lighting 
a fire’.
5 This is a long-established point in the philosophy of science.
Its origins are usually traced to Pierre Duhem’s Aim and
structure of physical theory; the locus classicus is Thomas
Kuhn’s Structure of scientific revolutions; and the fullest
development is probably Michel Polanyi’s Personal
knowledge: towards a post-critical philosophy.
6 Merely for form’s sake.
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